• Avoid Generalizing Across All Sex Offenders

    court room

    From United States vs. Wolf Child

    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding

    First, the district court relied on the fact that Wolf Child is now a convicted sex offender. This runs contrary to our holding that “a generalized assessment based on the class of sex offenders generally, rather than on the particular sex offenses a defendant has committed or related offenses he is likely to commit . . . , cannot fulfill the mandate that a term of supervised release satisfy the ‘reasonably related’ standard.” Weber, 451 F.3d at 569; accord Davis, 452 F.3d at 995.

    This need to avoid generalizing across all sex offenders “is all the more important in cases such as this, where a particularly strong liberty interest is at stake.” Weber, 451 F.3d at 566-67. not all sex offenders are the same; nor are all who plead to a particular type of sex offense. Imposing a supervised release condition that implicates a particularly significant liberty interest based solely on a conviction of a particular type, without consideration of the facts of the specific case or the goals of supervised release, constitutes clear procedural error.

    —from Editor:
    This particular case is interesting to Arizonans as it mostly pertains to liberties that are taken away from families and defendants when one is sentenced for a crime that is sexually related. In Arizona there is a rampant plague of Judges issuing life-time supervised release or lifetime probation which, in and of itself is just as illegal and unconstitutional as the Registry. see, U.S. Code › Title 18 › Part II › Chapter 227 › Subchapter D › § 3583
    (b)Authorized Terms of Supervised Release.—Except as otherwise provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are—
    (1) for a Class A or Class B felony, not more than five years;
    (2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years; and
    (3) for a Class E felony, or for a misdemeanor (other than a petty offense), not more than one year.

    The strongest argument that [I] can see from this case is the emphasis the Judge gives on the section  (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); There is a strength in the policy statements issued by the courts to issue a term of sentencing and post-sentencing factors to be consider when courts look at defendants on a one by one basis and consider the impact that a lifetime of probation and restrictions can have on an individual when they are released from prison sentences. the broad spectrum of punishment given to many (most) offending citizens is way over broad and does not meet the requirements of Sub Section 3583 […]involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary[.].

    Please read through the Wolf Child Appeal to understand the degree of resolvability of which Judge Haddon used to formidably correct the post-sentencing conditions of the defendant. If I may add, the Registry and all of its components ARE post sentencing conditions. Consider the affect of a persons’ ability to reintegrate into society with such a weight, such a burden of devolving conditions that are ignored by Judges when a sentence is given and further harm is caused by the Sex Offender Notification Requirements on decent family members and tax paying citizens.

    Categories: Civil Rights, Constitutionality, Court Findings

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